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MINIMUM COMMISSION RULES
versed the position it took in Ker v. California."5 Moreover, by
requiring the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt " that the
error did not contribute to the conviction, the Court may have for-
mulated a test so strict as to impose indirectly a test which makes
any trial error ground for automatic reversal,"2 a concept which the
majority of the Court specifically rejected.6" The new rule may also
affect the finality of state convictions 'by subjecting more of them
to attacks via habeas corpus in federal district courts." Finally, the
case is also significant in that it illustrates the creation by the Court
of what appears to be a twilight zone of power.
WILLIAm E. HOwARD
MONOPOLIES - IMMUNITY FROM ANTITRUST LIABILITY -
MINIMUM COMMISSION RATES OF STOCK EXCHANGES
Kaplan v. Lehman Brothers, 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1967),
petition for cert. filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3031 (U.S. July 4, 1967).
In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange' the United States Su-
preme Court first considered whether the Securities Exchange Act of
19342 immunizes the self-regulatory activities of stock exchanges
from antitrust liability.3 Observing that the statute contains no ex-
press exemption,4 the Court stated that "exchange self-regulation is
to be regarded as justified in response to antitrust charges only to
the extent necessary to protect the achievement of the aims of the
Securities Exchange Act."'5 Stated more explicatively, the conduct
of an exchange is subject to regulation by the antitrust laws unless
such submission would impair the supervisory powers of the Securi-
ties Exchange Commission (SEC) or otherwise impede the mainte-
nance of an honest and stable market.6
The recent case, Kaplan v. Lehman Brothers,7 presented a legal
6 5 In Ker the Court stated: "We reiterate that the reasonableness of a search is in
the first instance a substantive determination to be made by the trial court from the facts
and circumstances of the case and in light of the 'fundamental criteria' laid down by
the fourth amendment and ...this Court. ... Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33
(1963) (emphasis added).
06 Text accompanying note 21 supra.
67 Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, supra note 64, at 2.
68Text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.
6 9 Respondents Petition for Rehearing, supra note 64, at 7.
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question which forced the Seventh Circuit to interpret the Supreme
Court's broad statements in Silver. The plaintiffs in Kaplan
brought a shareholder's derivative suit on behalf of five mutual
funds8 and a representative class action on behalf of the funds'
shareholders against the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and
four of its members?
The complaint alleged that adherence by the defendants to the
NYSE rule prescribing the minimum commissions to be charged for
all transactions executed on the exchange" constituted a combina-
tion and conspiracy in restraint of trade and, consequently, a viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act.1 The plaintiffs prayed that
treble damages be assessed against the defendants pursuant to section
4 of the Clayton Act.' It was further requested that the minimum
commission rules of the exchange be declared null and void and that
1373 U.S. 341 (1963). The case was brought by an over-the-counter broker who
charged that the New York Stock Exchange had violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Sherman Act), by ordering its members
to discontinue wire connections with him without affording notice or opportunity for
a hearing. The Court imposed liability on the ground that no justification can be of-
fered for self-regulatory conduct where the exchange invokes its rules without granting
those affected thereby an occasion to explain their positions. 373 U.S. at 361.
2 15 U.S.C. 55 78a-hh (1964) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Act].
3 See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 55 1-7 (1964); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §5 12-27
(1964).
4 373 U.S. at 357.
5Id. at 361.
6 Cf. Exchange Act 55 2, 28(a), 15 U.S.C. 5§ 78b, 78bb (1964); Conference Re-
port on Exchange Act, 78 CONG. REc. 9930, 10,248 (1934).
7 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1967), petition for cert. filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3031 (U.S.
July 4, 1967).
8 The mutual funds involved were the One William Street Fund, Inc., The Lehman
Corp., Energy Fund, Inc., The Dominick Fund, Inc., and The Chemical Fund. For an
excellent description and analysis of mutual funds see SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R.
Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 89 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL
STUDY); Lobell, The Mutual Fund: A Structural Analysis, 47 VA. L REv. 181 (1961).
9 The member firms were Lehman Bros., Goodbody & Co., Dominick & Dominick,
Inc., and Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis. The investment advisors to the five mutual
funds mentioned in note 8 supra were also made nominal defendants.
10 The New York Stock Exchange commission rates and service charges are set forth
in N.Y.S.E. CONST. art. XV, in 2 CCH NYSE GUIDE S 1701. Noncompliance with
these rates subjects a member to suspension or expulsion from the exchange.
11 15 U.S.C. 5 1 (1964).
12 15 U.S.C. 5 15 (1964). The plaintiffs alleged that their actual damages were
the difference between the commission rates charged pursuant to the exchange rules
and the rates that would have been available if free and open competition had existed
in the market. Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 250 F. Supp. 562, 563 (N.D. Ill. 1966),
af 'd, 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1967), petition for cert. filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3031 (U.S.
July 4, 1967). The plaintiffs also prayed for actual damages, unmultiplied, on the
theory that the alleged misconduct also violated the Exchange Act. Id.
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such rules be replaced by open competition among the various mem-
ber brokers.
In affirming the district court's summary judgment in favor of
the defendants, the Seventh Circuit found that "the antitrust laws
are inapplicable to the New York Stock Exchange insofar as its pre-
scribing of minimum commission rates is concerned." 8  In arriving
at this conclusion the court tested and sustained two related hy-
potheses. 4
First, since section 19(b) of the Exchange Act 5 authorizes the
SEC "to alter or supplement the rules of... [an] exchange.., in
respect of such matters as... the fixing of reasonable rates of com-
mission," the Act obliquely empowers the exchanges to establish
minimum commission rates, for if they were not so empowered,
there would be no need for a provision sanctioning Commission
oversight.Y Therefore, since the Exchange Act was enacted subse-
quent to the Sherman Act, the later statute exempted those charging
exchange commission rates from antitrust liability by implication."
Second, because section 19(b) of the Exchange Act empowers
the SEC to alter exchange commission rates, that agency's considera-
tion of antitrust principles, as reflected in authorized commission
rates, should not be subject to judicial alteration. To hold other-
wise would interfere with the Commission's supervisory powers over
the exchanges."
The court's first premise unquestioningly adopts the view that
section 19(b)'s reference to reasonable rates of commission neces-
sarily authorizes the exchanges to establish and maintain minimum
rates of commission. However, nothing in the legislative history of
13 371 F.2d at 411.
14 Because of the brevity and turbidity of the court's opinion, it is impossible to de-
termine with certainty the exact grounds upon which the Kaplan decision was based.
However, in light of the district court's statements and the innuendoes in the opinion of
the Seventh Circuit it seems reasonable to conclude that the holding rested upon these
two hypotheses. See Bicks, Antitrust and the New York Stock Exchange, 21 Bus. LAW.
129, 149-54 (1965); Jennings, The New York Stock Exchange and the Commission
Rate Struggle, 21 Bus. LAw. 159 (1965).
15 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1964).
16 See Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 250 F. Supp. 562, 564-65 (N.D. Ill. 1966), afld,
371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1967), Petition for cert. filed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3031 (U.S. July 4,
1967).
17 371 F.2d at 411.
18 See id. In arriving at this conclusion the Seventh Circuit relied heavily upon dic-
tun in the Silver case suggesting that antitrust immunity might exist where the self-
regulatory activities of an exchange are exposed to SEC review. Silver v. New York
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 360 (1963) (dictum). However, the Silver Court empha-
sized that it was not resolving that question. Id. at 358 n.12.
19671
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:167
the Exchange Act supports this reasoning. 9 Minimum commission
rules were mentioned only twice while the bill was in committee,"
and on neither occasion was there any suggestion that the statute
would empower the exchanges to establish such rates.2 '
Furthermore, when Congress has desired to grant antitrust im-
munity in similar situations, it has expressly manifested that intent,22
but the Exchange Act makes no mention of anticompetitive exemp-
tion. In fact, section 28(a) of the Act states that "the rights and
remedies provided by this title shall be in addition to any and all
other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity."23  A
federal district court explained in United States v. Morgan:24
[T]his whole statutory scheme was worked out with the greatest
care by members of the Congress thoroughly aware of the anti-
trust problems ... and in possession of the fruits of many pro-
longed and penetrating investigations. They intended no exemp-
tion to the Sherman Act; and it is hardly possible that they would
inadvertently accomplish such a result25
Because the Exchange Act fails to expressly provide for antitrust
immunity and the legislative history of the statute intimates no such
exemption, the Kaplan court's hypothesis appears to be unjustified
and insufficient to support its conclusion.2"
Furthermore, merely because minimum commission rates have
19 Accord, Nerenberg, Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to the Securities Field,
16 W. REs. L. REV. 131, 150-51 (1964); Note, Antitrust and the Stock Exchange:
Minimum Commission or Free Competition?, 18 STAN. L. REV. 213, 224-25 (1965);
see SPECIAL STUDY pt. 2, at 300.
20 Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess., 6467, 7483-84, 7752-57 (1933-1934).
21 The Exchange Act's congressional draft bill originally authorized the SEC to re-
quire uniformity in commission rates. However, while the bill was in committee, it
was argued that the proposed legislation would enable the exchanges to charge "all that
the traffic will bear," for the Commission had no power to alter rates unless they were
inconsistent. Id. at 7705. Shortly thereafter, for no apparent reason, the word "uni-
form" was replaced by "reasonable," thus giving the SEC the authority to fix all rates.
By relating this change to the original committee objections, one could justifiably infer
that Congress had no intention of empowering the exchanges to establish commission
rates free from antitrust liability. Note, supra note 19, at 224-25; see Nerenberg, supra
note 19, at 150-51.
22 E.g., Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964) (exempting labor organizations);
Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. S 62 (1964) (exempting associations of producers
engaged in export trade); Walter-McCarran Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1964) (limited
exemption of insurance companies); Reed-Bulwinkle Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5b(9) (1964)
(exemption of rate agreements among carriers).
23 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964) (emphasis added).
24 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
25 Id. at 679 (dictum) (emphasis added).
26 Accord, Nerenberg, supra note 19, at 150-51; Note, supra note 19, at 219-25.
Contra, Bicks, supra note 14, at 152-53.
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been maintained by the New York Stock Exchange since its'incep-
tion,27 is insufficient for exemption from the antitrust laws. The
original immunity undoubtedly arose from the early restricted con-
cept of interstate commerce;28 however, the modern view of trade
restraints, ignoring many of the technical inadequacies of the past,29
certainly encompasses the minimum commissions of stock ex-
changes.
30
In relation to the court's second premise, the question to be re-
solved is whether the antitrust laws are inapplicable to the minimum
commission structure of stock exchanges because section 19(b) of
the Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to alter such rates. The ra-
tionale supporting this exemption is that, since regulation of the se-
curities field necessarily impedes competition to some extent, the
SEC should consider antitrust principles while exercising its super-
visory powers over the exchanges.31 Entrusting this duty to the
Commission - the body most thoroughly acquainted with the se-
curites industry - places the SEC in a position to evaluate the total
effect of any exchange activity and to administer the antitrust laws
accordingly.
3 2
In considering the court's theory it should first be noted that
there is nothing novel about applying the antitrust laws to an in-
dustry which is already subject to governmental control or regula-
tion."3 Also, the mere fact that a regulatory agency approves an
anticompetitive activity does not necessarily preclude the imposition
27 See B.F. SHUL'TZ, THE SEcuRrrms MARKET - AND How IT WORKS 2 (1963).
The exchange was established on May 17, 1792, by the famous Buttonwood Tree Agree-
ment which obligated 24 brokers to give preference to each other in their dealings and
to charge no less "than one quarter per cent Commission of the Specie value." Quoted
in id. at 2.
2 8 E.g., Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 594 (1898).
2 )See United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
3 0 See generally Note, supra note 19, at 219-24.
31 See Bicks, supra note 14, at 149-54.
32 See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 360-61 (1963) (dictum);
SPEcrAL STUDY pt. 4, at 707.
3 3 See Hale & Hale, Competition or Control I; The Chaos in the Cases, 106 U. PA.
L REv. 641 (1958); Hale & Hale, Competition or Control II; Radio & Television
Broadcasting, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 585 (1959); Hale & Hale, Competition or Control
III; Motor Carriers, 108 U. PA. L REV. 775 (1960); Hale & Hale, Competition or
Control IV; Air Carriers, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (1961); Hale & Hale, Competition
or Control V; Production & Distribution of Electrical Energy, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 57
(1961); Hale & Hale, Competition or Control VI; Application of the Antitrust Laws
to Regulated Industries, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 46 (1962); Schwartz, Legal Restriction of
Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67
HARV. L. REv. 436 (1954).
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of antitrust liability.3 4 Thus, unless there is some dear and over-
riding reason for immunity, stock exchanges and their minimum
commission rates should be subject to the antitrust laws, irrespective
of the existence of SEC supervision over the securities field. 5
Although there are convincing arguments both for8" and
against 7 the maintenance of minimum commission rates by stock
exchanges, it is significant that the Kaplan court never even con-
sidered whether there is a compelling reason for affording them
antitrust immunity. 8 The court simply found that, since "the fix-
ing of minimum commissions is one method of regulating commis-
sion rates," the antitrust laws are inapplicable for "in this situation
the self-regulatory function of the exchange has been exercised by
virtue of § 19(b)."" Admittedly, a self-regulatory function has
been performed; the question, however, is whether a clear basis
exists for antitrust exemption. By avoiding this issue, the Kaplan
court sidestepped the underlying problem before it.
In addition, a major fallacy permeates the court's assumption
that, since section 19(b) authorizes the SEC to alter and supplement
exchange commission rates, that body will observe the antitrust laws
while exercising its general supervisory powers over the securities
market. In reality, the Commission has been reluctant to exert its
powers against the exchanges. ° Since its inception in 1934, the
84 United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
35 Nerenberg, supra note 19, at 132.
36 Those supporting the maintenance of minimum commissions argue that abolition
of such rates would create conflicts of interest for broker-dealers, inhibit trading on
regional exchanges, produce evasive tactics (such as lumping small orders together) on
the part of nonmembers of an exchange seeking to obtain volume discounts, and gen-
erally lower the standards of business conduct See SPECIAL STUDY pt. 2, at 319. See
generally Note, supra note 19, at 236-37.
37 Those opposing the maintenance of minimum commissions argue that such rates
are highly discriminatory against nonexchange members, that they force investors to
pay for services that they do not need, and that investors would generally benefit if
commission rates were established in a competitive fashion. See SPECIAL STUDY pt. 2,
at 297. See generally Nerenberg, supra note 19, at 147-49; Note, supra note 19, at
233-37. One of the most adamant critics of the minimum commission structure is Pro-
fessor George J. Stigler of the University of Chicago who is presently crusading for the
total abolition of all such rates. Jennings, supra note 14, at 178.
38 In deference to the Seventh Circuit, the various interests may have been weighed
but not mentioned in the opinion. Quite possibly the actual basis for the Kaplan de-
cision was the court's feeling that the imposition of liability would have profound adverse
effects upon the stability of the securities market. However, if this is true, great con-
fusion could have been avoided by the court's being more explicit
39 371 F.2d at 411.
40 Accord, Nerenberg, supra note 19, at 157-60; see Cary, Self-Regulation in the
Securities Industry, 49 A.B.A.J. 244, 246 (1963).
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SEC has invoked its 19(b) powers on only one occasion, 41 and in
that instance the future existence of nearly all the regional ex-
changes was in great jeopardy.42 Moreover, the Commission has
never forcibly altered an exchange's commission rate structure, and
there is little to indicate that it has even thoroughly investigated
proposed rate revisions.4 Under these circumstances can it truth-
fully be said that the SEC -reviews the minimum commission rates
established by stock exchanges?
By holding as it did, the Seventh Circuit has made it possible
for stock exchanges to flagrantly abuse the antitrust policy of fair
trade without fear of retribution.44 If the courts defer to SEC juris-
diction, but the Commission refuses to exercise its supervisory
powers, the exchanges are in a position to charge as much as they
wish for their services.45 Such a situation would not only harm
investors, but it could eventually lead to the demise of the stock
exchanges themselves.4
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the proposition fa-
voring the administration of certain aspects of the antitrust laws by
the SEC has considerable merit.47 However, the theoretical bene-
4 1 Rules of the New York Stock Exch., 10 S.E.C. 270 (1941).
4 2 N.Y.S.E. CONST. art. XVI, § 8, precluded any Exchange member from dealing
"outside the Exchange in securities dealt in on the Exchange." When the NYSE an-
nounced that any member violating this rule would be subject to expulsion, the many
members serving as odd lot dealers on the regional exchanges resigned from these posi-
tions because they could no longer avail themselves of the substantial profits derived from
transactions involving dually listed securities. Since few other regional exchange members
had sufficient resources to serve as odd lot dealers, the continued existence of many
exchanges was in doubt. Rules of the New York Stock Exch., 10 S.E.C. 270, 274-92
(1941).
4 3 SPECIAL STUDy pt. 2, at 328-33. In fact, the NYSE increased its rates in 1958
while the SEC was still considering their reasonableness. Eleven months later the ex-
change voluntarily revised them when the Commission finally recommended that they
were excessive. Id. at 344-45.
4 4 Section 25 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1964), provides for judicial
review of Commission orders. However, if the SEC refuses to even consider a matter,
it appears doubtful that such inaction could be reviewed by the courts.
4 5 This is exactly what the Exchange Act was designed to prevent; the policy of in-
vestor protection should not be so easily circumvented. See note 21 s.upra & accom-
panying text.
4 6 1.argely because of the minimum commission structure of stock exchanges, non-
member brokers have been receiving a larger volume of business through the third
market. Without the restrictions of minimum rates, these brokers are able to charge
less than member dealers. See Jennings, supra note 14, at 165-66. Furthermore, a
"fourth market" has recently developed which completely bypasses all brokers by featur-
ing direct trading of blocks of stocks by large institutional investors. Id. at 166 n.20.
47 Mr. Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman of the SEC, has recently stated:
[Tjhe Commission with its responsibility and concern for these matters is
in the best position to comprehend and reconcile the diverse factors and con-
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fits are without practical meaning unless the Commission actively
utilizes those powers with which it is vested.45 Until it becomes
evident that the Commission is scrutinizing exchange rates for un-
desirable anticompetitive effects, the courts should be extremely
hesitant to grant any antitrust immunity.
W. JAMES OLLINGER
sideraions that may bear upon the public interest in the manifold circum-
stances under which [antitrust] questions may arise. Ad hoc determinations
in the antitrust courts of complex matters such as these could have an undesir-
able impact upon the quality of the markets and the interests of the investing
public. Letter from SEC to Senate Committee on Banking and Currency,
July 30, 1965, in 111 CONG. REc. 19,019, 19,022 (1965).
4 8 Although the SEC could probably assume active supervision over exchange com-
mission rates under the present provisions of the Exchange Act, it would be preferable
if new legislation were enacted providing for a definite procedure by which all rate
revisions would be subjected to review prior to their date of effectiveness. Such legisla-
tion could further specify the scope of the antitrust immunity and explain what prin-
ciples are to be applied by the SEC. Cf. id. at 19,019. See generally Jennings, supra
note 14, at 172-79.
